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PRIVATE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS WHO EXERCISE MANAGERIAL
AUTHORITY HELD OUTSIDE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT
NLRB v. Yeshiva University
The National Labor Relations Act' was enacted to strengthen
the position of the employee in industrial labor-management rela-
tions.2 Persons found to be employees within the meaning of the Act
have the right to "join. . .labor unions. . . and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining."' 3 Sec-
t 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-i69 (1976).
2 See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). The National Labor Relations Act,
as amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), is designed to reduce labor strife within commer-
cial organizations. Id. § 151; see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963). See
generally Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through
Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63 (1973). Prior to the enactment of modern labor legisla-
tion, dissension between labor and management often resulted in a disruption of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill.
1894), affl'd, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Initially, the laws were applied to discourage employee
organization. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case), 3
COMMONS & GILMORE, Doc. HisT. AM. Soc. 59-248 (1806) (organizers found guilty of criminal
conspiracy); Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (employee organi-
zation prohibited by antitrust legislation); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (ex parte injunction
enjoining railway strike). This trend was reversed when Congress enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)) in an
attempt to protect workers and ameliorate the economic effects of the Depression. While the
Norris-LaGuardia Act did not require employers to negotiate with unions, it did improve the
political climate for unions by eliminating the power of the federal courts to enjoin their
activities. See 1 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW §§ 4.03[2], 4.04-.05[4] (1978). See generally R.
WYKSTRA & E. STEVENS, LABOR LAW & PUBLIc POLICY 109-37 (1970). The subsequent enact-
ment of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), reflected a marked shift in the attitude of the public and Congress
toward industrial unionization. Hearings on S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in
I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, 1935, 464-73 (1949) [hereinafter cited as I LEGIS.
HIST.]; see H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA 1935, 3046-47 (1949) [hereinafter cited as II LEGIS. HiST.]; see 1 T.
KHEEL, supra, § 5.01[3]; 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.2 (1968). Adopted after the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), ch. 90, § 1, 48 Stat. 198 (1933), was declared unconstitu-
tional in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Wagner Act was
designed to control labor disputes affecting interstate commerce and indirectly to improve
the purchasing power of the industrial worker. See Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin
& Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 199 (1961). The Wagner Act guaranteed
employees the right to join unions and the freedom to bargain collectively and imposed an
affirmative obligation upon employers to bargain with the union in good faith. 29 U.S.C. §
8(a)(5) (1976). The recognition that workers needed protection from unfair employment prac-
tices made possible the development of modem labor organizations. See R. WYKSTRA & E.
STEVENS, supra, at 139-57. See generally 1 T. KHEEL, supra §§ 2.01-.07.
Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides that
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
tion 2(11) of the Act, however, excludes supervisors from the defini-
tion of employee if they have the authority, "in the interests of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, . . . or effec-
tively to recommend such action."4 In addition, under a judicially
created exception to the statute's mandate, "managers" who
"formulate and effectuate management policies"5 are not protected
by the provisions of the Act.' Since these exceptions were formu-
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ....
4 NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). An employee is treated as a supervisor under
the Act when he has the power to affect directly another's job status or "to effectively
recommend" to the employer that any of the actions enumerated in § 2(11) be taken. Even
if the employer merely considers an employee's recommendation, the employee may be
deemed a supervisor within the meaning of the statute. Eastern Greyhound Lines v. NLRB,
337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964).
Initially, supervisors were allowed to join unions provided they were not in units with
the employees they supervised. Union Collieries Coal Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 165, supplementing
41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942). The Board soon changed this policy, however, ruling that supervisory
personnel wereper se excluded from the Act's protection. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
733 (1943). Thus, employers could not be forced to bargain in good faith with a unit composed
of supervisors. See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626 (1945). The legislative aim of
preserving the employer's leverage over his supervisory personnel was cited as the primary
justification for precluding the unionization of those employees who were responsible for
implementing the employer's policies. See, e.g., Laborers & Hod Carriers Local v. NLRB, 564
F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1977); Stop & Shop Cos. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1977);
GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1975); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 139 (1974). See generally T. KHEEL, supra note 2, §§ 1.03, 5.01-.03.
1 Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947); see Retail Clerks
Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967).
' The exclusion of managerial employees is not required by the language of the Act.
NLRB v. Mercy College, 536 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1976), denying enforcement of 219
N.L.R.B. 81 (1975). The doctrine was created by the Board and endorsed by the courts. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974); NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop.,
446 F.2d 602, 604-09 (8th Cir. 1971). In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court determined that
an employee who acts as a "manager" isper se precluded from joining a labor union. 416 U.S.
at 289. In so holding, the Court rejected the Board's intermediate position which permitted
managerial employees to unionize unless their activities created a conflict of interest. Id. at
289 n.18. Under the Bell Aerospace rule, if an employee exercises "discretion in the perform-
ance of [his job] independent of [the] employer's established policy," he is considered a
true representative of management who cannot unionize under the Act. General Dynamics
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974); see NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 570 F.2d
586, 592 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 81 (1978). Although this description of a managerial
employee would appear to encompass professionals whose advice often is utilized in the
formulation of company policy, the Board and the courts have concluded that such profes-
sional employees are not part of management, since the employer need not follow their
suggestions. Absent a showing of independent policymaking authority, a professional em-
ployee is not considered a manager. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 858 (1974);
see NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 570 F.2d 586, 592 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 81 (1978). See also note 10 infra.
1979]
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lated in the context of industrial labor relations, 7 analytical difficul-
ties arose when the National Labor Relations Board8 attempted to
apply them to private, nonprofit educational institutions.' Although
faculty members at institutions of higher learning often have many
of the characteristics of "supervisors" or "managers," the Board
routinely classified them as "professional employees" who are spe-
cifically protected by the Act.'0 Recently, however, in NLRB v.
I See, e.g., NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 554 (1st Cir. 1975); Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951); Kahn, supra note 2, at 74.
' The National Labor Relations Board encompasses both the Office of the General Coun-
sel, which has the primary policing responsibility, and the administrative panels chosen to
implement the Board's functions. These functions include resolving unfair labor practice
claims, determining whether jurisdiction is proper and evaluating the propriety of proposed
bargaining units in representation cases. J. JENKINS, supra note 2, §§ 2.3, .24, .39-.42; see note
14 infra. See generally 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 2, §§ 1.02, 5.01[4][c], 6.03.
1 For many years, the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, declined to apply the Act
to nonprofit educational institutions. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424
(1951). This policy was reversed, however, when the Board found that private universities
have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to warrant federal involvement in their labor
disputes. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 329 (1970); see NLRA §§ 2(6)-(7), 29 U.S.C. §§
152(6)-(7) (1976). Nevertheless, the Board has opted not to exercise jurisdiction over private
nonprofit colleges and universities with gross annual revenues of less than $1,000,000 exclu-
sive of contributions unavailable for operating expenses. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1977). Addition-
ally, the Board will not participate unless the proposed union is a bona fide labor organization
under 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976) and a question of representation affecting commerce exists
under 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
Since the assertion of jurisdiction in Cornell involved nonprofessional, nonsupervisory
employees, the issues were comparable to those involving employees in the industrial sector.
See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970). Consequently, application of the Act to such
university employees presented few logical difficulties. After Cornell, however, university
professors sought to take advantage of the Act's protection. See C.W. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). While the Board in C. W. Post indicated that both full-time and part-
time university professors were entitled to join unions, it concluded that department chairper-
sons and deans were supervisors whose organizational efforts were unprotected under the Act.
Id. at 905-06. This result was modified in New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973), wherein
the Board refused to recognize part-time faculty unionization but allowed department chair-
persons to join faculty unions. Id. at 6, 9; see Kendall College v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir. 1978).
10 See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); C.W. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976) defines a professional em-
ployee as
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied
in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance;
(iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type . .. acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning ....
When the Labor Management Recording Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, was introduced in the House of Representatives, it did not include a provision
specifically addressed to professional employees. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 84-85. Prior to
the statute's enactment, however, a provision was added "coverfing] such persons as legal,
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Yeshiva University, 11 the Second Circuit rejected this view, holding
that a university faculty's extensive participation in the administra-
tive and policy decisions of the institution through various faculty
committees made them managerial employees who were outside the
protection of the Act.
2
In Yeshiva, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association (the
Union) sought to become the exclusive bargaining agent for full-
time faculty members at the University. 3 After obtaining an ade-
quate showing of faculty support, the Union petitioned the Board
for certification as an appropriate bargaining unit. 4 At the subse-
engineering, scientific, and medical personnel together with their junior professional assist-
ants." H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 1135, 1141. No mention was made of professional educators. See NLRB v.
Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550, 554 (1st Cir. 1975). While testimony at the hearings prior to
the Act's passage indicated that persons such as architects and scientists were to be included
under the statute's protection, see 93 CONG. REc. 3662 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Jackson),
coverage of university professors apparently was not contemplated. See H. R. CONF. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1135, 1141.
Nevertheless, in a series of decisions, the Board asserted jurisdiction over university profes-
sors. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904
(1971); Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). One commentator has suggested that the
overlap between sections 2(11) (supervisors) and 2(12)(professional employees) has not been
given adequate consideration by the Board and has given rise to ambiguous decisions. Finkin,
The Supervisory Status of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 805, 805-06, 810-23
(1977). Compare American Oil Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965), with Mental Health Serv.-Erie
County S.E. Corp. v. Buffalo, 220 N.L.R.B. 96 (1975), and General Dynamics Corp., 213
N.L.R.B. 851 (1974), and Frederic Confer & Assoc., 193 N.L.R.B. 910 (1971), and Fort Tyron
Nursing Home, 223 N.L.R.B. 769 (1976).
" 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), denying enforcement of 231 N.L.R.B. 125 (1977), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3541 (Feb. 20, 1979).
Il 582 F.2d at 699.
" Id. at 690 & nn.4-5. Yeshiva is a private nonprofit university chartered under the laws
of New York. Id. at 689. The Union sought to represent the faculty at six of the University's
undergraduate colleges and four of its graduate schools. Id. at 689-90.
" Id. at 688-89. To qualify as the exclusive bargaining agent for a group of employees a
union must demonstrate that it has the support of a majority of the members in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). A bargaining unit is "appropriate" if sufficient
"mutuality of interests in wages, hours, and working conditions" exists among the proposed
unit members. Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 782 (1952) See generally Moore, The
Determination of Bargaining Units for College Faculties, 37 U. PiTr. L. REv. 43 (1975); Note,
Determination of the Appropriate Faculty Bargaining Unit in a Private University-New
York University, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 423 (1973); Note, The Appropriate Faculty
Bargaining Unit in Private Colleges and Universities, 59 VA. L. REv. 492 (1973). A union
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of employees by means of either Board
certification after a representation election, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976), or employer recogni-
tion, id. § 159(a). Under the first method, the union must obtain signature cards from one
third of the employees in the proposed unit and thereafter petition the Board for an election.
Id. § 159(c). The Board then conducts a hearing to ascertain the appropriateness of the
designated unit, the validity of the showing of support and the propriety of the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction. Id. § 159(c)(1). If the union is successful at this stage, the Board will
direct that an election be held. If the union obtains a majority vote, it will be certified as the
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quent Board hearings, the University contended that "faculty mem-
bers [were] managerial or supervisory personnel and hence not
employees within the meaning of the Act."15 The Board's Regional
Director, however, determined that Yeshiva's faculty members were
professional employees entitled to the Act's protection and certified
the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for full-time faculty.5
When the University refused to bargain, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges against Yeshiva.17 Ultimately, the Board sustained
the Union's complaint and ordered the University to bargain in good
faith. 8 When Yeshiva again refused to negotiate, the Board peti-
tioned the Second Circuit for enforcement of the bargaining order. 9
The Second Circuit denied the petition.'" Writing for a unani-
exclusive bargaining agent. Id. § 159(c)(3). This was the route utilized by the union in
Yeshiva. Occasionally, a union may circumvent the election procedure by demonstrating to
the employer that it has signature cards representing the support of a majority of employees
in an appropriate bargaining unit. If the employer concurs in this finding, it can bypass Board
procedures and recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining agent. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1976). See generally 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 2, §§ 6.02[31, 13.01(1], .02[4][bl-
[ci; 1 J. JENKINS, supra note 2, §§ 3.1, .27, .40.
" 582 F.2d at 688-89. Several hearings were conducted between Nov. 26, 1974 and May
6, 1975, to determine the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. The union sought a unit
comprised of all full-time faculty members, including deans and officers of the university.
Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 (1975). The university contended that full-time
faculty or, in the alternative, department chairpersons, deans and assistant deans were man-
agers or supervisors and therefore should be excluded from the unit. Id. at 1053-54.
81 582 F.2d at 689. The Board found that the appropriate unit included full-time faculty,
assistant deans, department chairpersons and terminal employees who were on staff at the
time of the election. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054-56.
" 582 F.2d at 689. The only means by which an employer can challenge an order to
bargain with a certified union is to refuse to bargain and await the commencement of an
unfair labor practice proceeding by the union under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) (interference
with the right to self-organization) or id. § 158(a)(5) (refusal to bargain collectively with a
union).
" 582 F.2d at 689. Although the Act requires an employer to negotiate in good faith with
the exclusive bargaining agent, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1965), it does not mandate that the parties reach consensus. White v. NLRB,
255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958).
" 582 F.2d at 689. When an unfair labor charge is filed, the General Counsel's Regional
Director conducts an investigation. If he decides not to issue a complaint, the decision may
be appealed to the General Counsel, who makes a final determination. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1976). If a complaint is issued, the Regional Counsel will represent the complaining party's
interest at an adversarial hearing conducted by an administrative law judge whose decision
is appealable by either party to the Board's adjudicatory panel. Id. A Board order may be
reviewed or enforced in the appropriate federal court of appeals. Id. § 160(e)-(f). The order is
entitled to enforcement if supported "by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Id.
§ 160(f); see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 477 (1950); NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, 570 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 81 (1978); NLRB v. Stark,
525 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OF THE SEVENTIES § 30.-00, at 691 (1976).
2 582 F.2d at 703.
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mous panel,2' Judge Mulligan emphasized that the court's reasoning
was addressed only to the internal organizational structure prevail-
ing at Yeshiva.22 Disputing the Board's findings that Yeshiva's fac-
ulty members were neither supervisors nor managerial employees,23
the court proceeded to evaluate the four principles frequently used
by the Board as a basis for including full-time private university
professors within the protective coverage of the Act.24 Judge Mulli-
gan examined the Board's contention that, as professionals, a class
of employees specifically protected by the Act, full-time university
faculty members cannot also be categorized as supervisors or man-
agers. '- Stating "that [professional] status per se does not preclude
[faculty from being classified] as supervisory or managerial person-
nel, ' 2" the court distinguished between faculty members who exer-
cise discretion solely with respect to teaching methodology, and
those who are instrumental in formulating the "central policies of
the institution" and are "substantially and pervasively operating
the enterprise."27 Since they wield extensive influence through their
" The Yeshiva panel was comprised of Judges Lumbard, Mulligan and Timbers.
582 F.2d at 696. Although he recognized that faculty plays an important role in the
decisionmaking process at many universities, Judge Mulligan noted that the organization
structure at Yeshiva varies significantly from that at other institutions. Id. At each of Yesh-
iva's subdivisions, Judge Mulligan observed, professors freely participate in decisions con-
cerning such educational policies as curriculum, admissions criteria, grading and academic
standards. Id. Since professors also have significant input into employment issues such as
tenure, promotion, scheduling and hiring, the court concluded that the full-time faculty at
Yeshiva, in effect, directs university policy. Id. at 690-94, 698.
Although it recognized that the Board's factual findings are to be accorded great
weight by the reviewing court, id. at 702 (citing Stop & Shop Cos. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 18
(lst Cir. 1977)), the Second Circuit concluded that in Yeshiva the Board "made no factual
finding which would preclude supervisory or managerial status, nor [had it] advanced a
persuasive rationale for refusing to categorize Yeshiva's faculty." 582 F.2d at 702. Expressing
some impatience with the Board's case by case approach to the unique issues raised by
unionization in universities, Judge Mulligan suggested that the "appropriate method to
explore fully the special problems [in this area] would be rulemaking." 582 F.2d at 703.
1' 582 F.2d at 697-702. The court stated that the Board's decision in Yeshiva was reached
"without any analysis" and could not "withstand careful scrutiny." Id. at 696-97.
1 Id. at 697-98. Under § 2(12) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976), a professional
employee is included within the statute's coverage even though he exercises broad discretion
in his job. See note 10 supra. Relying on this provision, the Board has established a per se
rule with respect to faculty members in private universities. Even where the faculty appeared
effectively to recommend university policies, a finding sufficient to deny protection in the
industrial sector, the Board consistently held that university professors are professional em-
ployees who are entitled to unionize. See, e.g., Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975),
enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247
(1975); Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 971 (1974); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634
(1974); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); C.W.
Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
", 582 F.2d at 697.
21 Id. at 697-98. The court stated: "[WIhile we readily concede that Yeshiva's full-time
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committees, Judge Mulligan reasoned that faculty members at
Yeshiva are both professional and managerial employees.2
Turning to the Board's contention that full-time faculty mem-
bers are not supervisors or managers within the meaning of the
statute when they act collectively rather than individually,2 Judge
Mulligan conceded that the Act is ambiguous but noted that the
Board itself had excluded employees who exercised supervisory au-
thority through committees.30 With respect to the Board's theory
that faculty members are not supervisors or managers because they
act on their own behalf and not in the interests of their employer,
the court stressed the atmosphere of "shared authority" that gov-
erns the university setting.31 Observing that professional educators
faculty satisfy the Act's criteria for professional status, we reject the Board's position that
by the possession and exercise of. . .broad powers . . . the full-time faculty at Yeshiva act
only as professionals and not in a managerial or supervisory capacity." Id. at 698.
29 Id.
19 Id. The view that faculty members are not supervisory or managerial personnel when
they act collectively was first enunciated by the Board in C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B.
904 (1971), and reaffirmed in Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of
Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), and Fordham
Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971). In Adelphi, however, the Board indicated that its "collective
authority" rule was, at least in part, a product of the analytical difficulties posed by the
attempts of university faculty to unionize. 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
Id. at 698-99 (citing Florida So. College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972)). Judge Mulligan
was particularly concerned that the Board categorically had determined that collective fac-
ulty action is nonsupervisory despite the ambiguity of the statute. 582 F.2d at 699. The
Board's inconsistent position was compounded, in the court's view, by the lack of support in
the Act's legislative history for the "collective authority" doctrine. Id. The court noted that
a team approach to decisionmaking is a common occurence in both the commercial sector
and the private university setting. See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
While it did not resolve the issue definitively, the court suggested that a "realistic interpreta-
tion" of § 2(11) would lead to the conclusion that "individuals who exercise supervisory
functions as part of a group or committee" are "supervisors" within the meaning of that
provision. 582 F.2d at 699. Compare Florida So. College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972), and
Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 194 (1971), with Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B.
247, 248 (1975), and University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 635 (1974). It should be noted
that, although individual professors "supervise" graduate assistants, students and ancillary
personnel, supervisory status requires the direction of statutory employees. 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (1976). Thus, the Board has held that faculty members are not statutory supervisors
because neither students, Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1972), nor graduate assistants,
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), are employees within the meaning of § 2(3).
11 582 F.2d at 700. Although the system of governance in higher education has been
characterized as collegial, it is more accurately described by reference to the "shared author-
ity" model. Kahn, supra note 2, at 72-73. The collegial model involves a community of
scholars in which each member is deemed a "first among equals." Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker
& Riley, Alternative Models of Governance in Higher Education, reprinted in GoVERNING
ACADEMIC ORGANIZATIONS 2, 11-13 (G. Riley & J. Baldridge, eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Alternative Models]; Mintz, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: A Manage-
ment Perspective, 3 J. OF L. & EDuc. 413, 414 (1974). Under this approach, only faculty
members are involved in the decisionmaking process; the board of trustees, the university
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and administrators at private universities necessarily share a set of
common goals,3 2 the ourt found no evidence that faculty and uni-
versity interests at Yeshiva were, in fact, divergent.3 3 Finally, the
court found the argument that faculty members are not
''supervisors" or "managers" because they are subject to the ulti-
mate authority of the Board of Trustees "particularly unconvinc-
ing." 3 Judge Mulligan reasoned that, since "every corporation is
ultimately operated by its Board of Directors,"3 a literal application
of this argument would lead to the nonsensical conclusion that no
person working within a corporation could be classified as a man-
ager or supervisor within the meaning of the Act.31
Enacted primarily in response to industrial labor strife, the
National Labor Relations Act was designed with a view toward the
complete divergence in the interests of management and labor.37
president and the students are not included. Hagengruber, Reasons Why Faculty Members
Accept or Reject Unions in Higher Education: The University of Wisconsin Experience, 7 J.
OF L. & EDUC. 53, 55-57 (1978). In contrast, under the concept of shared authority, there is
an "inescapable interdependence among the governing board, the administration, . . . the
faculty," and the student body. Kahn, supra note 2, at 70. Decisions result from collective
discussion and consensus among the faculty. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972).
See generally J. MiLLrr, TH ACAflMUC CoMMuNrrY (1962).
: Judge Mulligan noted that the common goals that prevail in the educational setting
are 'unknown among professionals in private industry."' 582 F.2d at 700 (quoting Kahn,
supra note 2, at 68).
0 582 F.2d at 700. Although Judge Mulligan conceded that the faculty may have been
motivated by its own best interests, he reasoned that "the fact that the administration and
Board of Trustees of Yeshiva so rarely interfered in the faculty decisions indicates that the
interests of the faculty and of the University were almost always co-extensive." Id. The court
endorsed the notion that "'[tihe university is, ideally, a professional community in which
common educational interests supercede all potential divisions between the faculty and the
administration."' Id. at 701 (quoting Kahn, supra note 2, at 68).
3' 582 F.2d at 701.
Id. (citing W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 153 (4th ed. 1969)).
582 F.2d at 701-02. The court noted that, although the university administration was
subject to the ultimate authority of the board of trustees, its members clearly would be
categorized as supervisory or managerial personnel. Id. at 701. In addition, since the statutory
definition of "supervisor" included one who has the power effectively to recommend, the court
reasoned that review by higher authority was contemplated by the framers of the Act. Id. at
702 & n.19; see Transformer Eng'rs, 114 N.L.R.B. 1325, 1327 (1955).
11 Significantly, at the hearings prior to ratification of the Wagner Act, representatives
and partisans of management vehemently opposed the bill, see Keyserling, supra note 2, at
201-02; Testimony of W. Bell on S. 2629, reprinted in I LEGIs. HiST., supra note 2, at 546,
550-51; Testimony of C. Craigmite, reprinted in id. at 600, 604-05, while proponents of organ-
ized labor fought for its enactment. See, e.g., Testimony of E. Herrick, Hearings on S. 2926,
reprinted in id. at 220, 220-22; Testimony of R.G. Wagnet, Hearings on S. 2926 reprinted in
id. at 311, 312-13. It appears, however, that neither Congress nor the bill's detractors and
supporters anticipated that it would be applied in a noncommercial setting. See Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 425 n.3 (1951); Wagner, Company Union:A Vast Industrial
Issue, reprinted in I LE-is. HiST., supra note 2, at 206-10; Madden, Origin & Early Years of
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When the Board determined in the early 1970's that the Act is
applicable to private, nonprofit universities, 38 new theories had to
be developed to account for the nonadversarial "labor-
management" relationships that typify the educational setting. 9
Consequently, the Board developed an analytical framework in
which faculty members who participate in administrative and pol-
icy decisions are nevertheless viewed as "professional employees"
because they often act collectively, in their own self interest and
without the power to ultimately implement their own decisions. 0
While this approach differed significantly from the typical applica-
tion of the Act in the industrial context," it was thought to be more
the National Labor Relations Act, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1967). See generally Kahn, supra
note 2, at 84-95.
1 See note 9 supra.
31 While the organizational structure of the profitmaking commercial corporation shares
some characteristics with the nonprofit private educational institution, the two are distin-
guishable. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 63-68; NLRB Briefs and Decision New York Univ. and
Syracuse Univ. (1972), reprinted in FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEvENTIES app. F, at 264 (T.
Tice ed. 1973). Although both types of organizations have specific goals, a hierarchical sys-
tem, officials with designated duties, a formal decisionmaking process and a bureaucratic
administration which handles routine matters, Alternative Models, supra note 31, at 2-3, the
commercial corporation is necessarily more bureaucratic and hierarchical. Generally, its poli-
cies are determined by a manager without input from the rank and file members. Id. at 9-10.
See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1964). Authority
is delegated from the board of directors to the corporate officers, to supervisory personnel and
finally to the employees. Kahn, supra note 2, at 71-72. In contrast, the organizational struc-
ture of the modem university is less rigid and consequently, institutional change can be
effected by a larger and more diverse group of "managers." See Alternative Models, supra
note 31, at 6; Mintz, supra note 31, at 43; Finkin, Collective Bargaining and University
Government, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 149, 150 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Collective Bargaining].
Although the board of trustees remains legally responsible for the corporation's activities,
Clark, Faculty Authority, 47 A.A.U.P. BULL. 293, 293 (1961); see Kahn, supra note 2, at 71-
72, decisions are reached through the joint effort of the faculty, the university president and
his administration and the board of trustees. Id. at 70-74. Moreover, unlike the commercial
corporation, the educational corporation is characterized by somewhat ambiguous goals, a
fragmented professional staff and a problematic technology for dealing with clients (students)
who often demand a voice in decisionmaking. Alternative Models, supra note 31, at 3-6.
Finally, its employees, the faculty, enjoy greater freedom of speech and thought and signifi-
cantly more authority than is possible in commercial corporations. J. CORSON, Gov-PNANCE
OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITIES 97-117 (1960); see Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its
Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 120, 122 (1972). These organizational and philosophical
differences make application of the Act to the nonprofit university setting problematic. Adel-
phi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 & n.3 (1972); see Mintz, supra note 31, at 41; Tice, Pros &
Cons of Collective Bargaining, in FACULTY POWER: COLLECrIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 129,
131-32 (T. Tice ed. 1972).
11 See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B.
971 (1974); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
1' Under the Board's traditional analysis, § 2(11) is read in the disjunctive. Thus, an
employee may be deemed a supervisor if he possesses only one of the section's enumerated
powers. NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 1324 (2d Cir. 1976); Wisconsin River
Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47, 50 (7th Cir. 1976); Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176
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responsive to the unique traits of the educational setting. The re-
sult, however, was a per se classification of university faculty mem-
bers as covered employees.
In rejecting this per se approach in Yeshiva, the Second Circuit
appeared to be indicating its preference for a more precise standard
for evaluating the applicability of the Act's provisions to the variety
of "labor-management" relationships that characterize modem uni-
versities. It would seem that the Board's rulemaking authority could
provide a satisfactory tool for developing such a framework. 2 It is
F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949). Accordingly, it has been held that
employees who determine employee assignments, transfer other employees or generally over-
see the company's work product are statutory supervisors who are unprotected by the Act.
NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carridrs, Inc., 558 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Gray Line Tours,
Inc., 461 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1972). The determination of supervisory status is based on the
employee's actual duties including such factors as the type of work done, the responsibility
exercised and the organizational structure involved. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B.
851, 858 (1974); see Mourning v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Global Marine Dev.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 92, 94 (9th Cir. 1975). The employee does not lose his supervisory
status merely because his authority is delegated or subject to review. Eastern Greyhound Line
v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84, 87-88 (6th Cir. 1964). Moreover, as long as an employee uses indepen-
dent judgment in exercising § 2(11) authority instead of serving as a mere conduit for manage-
ment policy, the employee is viewed as a statutorily excluded supervisor. See NLRB v.
Harmon Indus. Inc., 565 F.2d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 1977). Even if the employee does not
exercise his judgment solely for the employer's interest, he may be deemed a supervisor in
the industrial context since employer and employee interests may be intertwined. NLRB v.
Scott Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 630 (1st Cir. 1971); see Deaton Truck Line, Inc., v. NLRB,
337 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 903 (1965). Additionally, although
the Board consistently has held that the exercise of mere discretion does not result in exclu-
sion from the Act, it has concluded that the power effectively to recommend management
decisions will take an employee outside the protection of the Act. See Mourning v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 768, 770 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Stop & Shop Cos. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir.
1977); GAP Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1975). It should be noted that it is
the possession of supervisory power rather than its exercise that determines whether an
employee is a supervisor within the meaning of § 2(11). NLRB v. Harmon Indus., Inc., 565
F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1977); Global Marine Dev., Inc. v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1975);
Eastern Greyhound Lines v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1964).
42 It has been suggested that rulemaking would be the most effective method for address-
ing the question whether professional employees of universities are "supervisors." Interim
Report and Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB, [1976] 1 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 221, 236; AAUP, PETITION TO THE NLRB FOR PROCEEDINGS FOR RULEMAKING
IN REPRESENTATION CASES INVOLVING FACULTY MEMBERS IN COLLEGES & UNIVEmRrIES, June 18,
1971. The Board, however, has taken the position that the adjudicatory method with its
inherent flexibility is a more desirable approach. NLRB, ORDER DENYING THE PETITION OF THE
AAUP FOR RuLEMAKING, July 16, 1971. See generally, Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1965).
Challenging this position, one commentator has suggested several alternative approaches
for addressing faculty bargaining unit problems. Kahn, supra note 2, at 166-79. According to
Professor Kahn, Congress could enact legislation "tailored to the unique characteristics of the
academic community," id. at 166, or the Board could utilize its formal rulemaking procedures
"to gather sufficient data to make reasoned decisions" regarding faculty unionization. Id. at
172. The Board might also appoint a special advisory panel to assist in evaluating the wisdom
19791
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submitted, however, that the Yeshiva court's rationale does not
supply adequate guidelines for the Board to use in formulating pre-
cise rules for the unionization of university faculty. Implicit in the
Yeshiva court's holding is the view that the Act, which was designed
to equalize the bargaining positions of employee and employer, ordi-
narily does not apply to employees who share the organizational
goals and decisionmaking authority of their employers.13 Since most
private nonprofit universities are characterized by the "shared au-
thority" model of governance," the Yeshiva reasoning would seem
to establish the equivalent of a per se rule that, in most instances,
will preclude university faculty from organizing.
The better approach, it is suggested, would include a recogni-
tion that, while both university administrators and faculty mem-
bers have some goals in common, they also have divergent interests.
This is reflected in faculty demands for academic freedom and
higher salary levels on the one hand and administration attempts
to preserve fiscal responsibility on the other.4" It seems possible to
of permitting unionization. Id. at 175-76. Finally, the Board might establish a division to
conduct research into the "economic facts of life in higher education" and the feasibility of
collective bargaining at the university level. Id. at 178. Another commentator has suggested
that the Board could clarify its position on appropriate faculty bargaining units by institu-
tionalizing the 50% Rule articulated in Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972). Finkin, supra
note 10, at 832-34. Under this approach only those professors who spend more than one-half
of their time engaged in § 2(11) activities would be treated as statutory supervisors. Id.
3 Some commentators have suggested that the university is an inappropriate forum for
collective bargaining. Edwards, Legal Aspects of the Duty to Bargain, in FACULTY BARGAINING
IN THE SEVENTIES 21, 23-24 (T. Tice ed. 1973). Arguing that the adversarial quality of collective
bargaining is inimical to the system of self-governance which, at least in theory, characterizes
most universities, these commentators contend that collective bargaining will polarize the
university and interfere with its primary functions. Boyd, Collective Bargaining in Academe:
Causes and Consequences, 57 Lia. EDUC. 306 (1971); Kadish, supra note 39, at 122; Wollett,
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: An Organizational Perspective, 3 J. OF
L. & EDUC. 425, 429 (1974); EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES REPORT, reprinted in
FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES app. K at 337-39 (T. Tice ed. 1973). Other commenta-
tors, however, believe that, as long as university unions are careful to protect the faculty's
role in educational policymaking, unionization can exist in academia. Davis, Unions and
Higher Education: Another View, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 317, 320 (1968). Supporters of this theory
reason that the availability of a separate forum for faculty members to express their profes-
sional concerns and influence educational policy is important to the preservation of the
quality of the educational system. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATE-
MENT ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1972), reprinted in FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES
app. L, at 341-42 (T. Tice ed. 1973); McHugh, Faculty Bargaining: Practical Considerations
in Faculty Power, in FACULTY POWER: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 37, 44 (T. Tice ed.
1972); see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, TASK FORCE REPORT FACULTY PARTICI-
PATION IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AAHE REP.]; A. DYKES,
FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC DECISION MAKING 19-22, 40 (1968).
See generally note 31 supra.
In most academic institutions, the common goals of the trustees, the administration
and the faculty include educating students and increasing the knowledge of the intellectual
[Vol. 53:348
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draw a distinction between faculties at institutions such as Yeshiva,
where the professional staff enjoys decisionmaking authority in vir-
tually every aspect of university administration, and faculties whose
organizational power is less extensive. An argument might be made,
for example, that where the faculty lacks discretion in formulating
department budgets and the board of trustees retains substantial
control over personnel decisions affecting faculty, the faculty mem-
bers are not supervisors or managers under the Act." Moreover,
since participation in the development of academic policies may be
viewed as an integral part of the university faculty member's tradi-
tional job function, the Board could conclude that the judicially
created "managerial" classification should not be applied in cases
involving educational institutions."
community in general. AAHE REP., supra note 42, at 22. In order to effectuate these objec-
tives, however, the board of trustees and administration may focus on fiscal solvency and cost
effectiveness while the faculty may emphasize academic concerns such as research and exper-
imentation. See Clark, supra note 39; Comment, University of Chicago v. NLRB-Seventh
Circuit Affirms a National Labor Relations Board-Created Hybrid Employee-Supervisory
Category Under the National Labor Relations Act, 6 Loy. Cm. L.J. 758, 768 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hybrid]. Although the Yeshiva court found no divergence in university
and faculty interests, 582 F.2d at 701, it may be argued that the board of trustees and faculty
are not co-equal managers but professionals with independent responsibilities whose duties
overlap only when joint effort is needed to achieve the institutional objectives. Under this
analysis, the board of trustees is the primary manager of the university and the faculty's
authority is subject to whatever limitations the administration elects to impose upon it. It
has been suggested that unionization is necessary where a university has no internal organiza-
tion to represent its faculty's interest or where the system of shared authority has become
less responsive to faculty interests. See AAHE REP., supra note 42, at 3, 63-66; Marmion,
Unions and Higher Education, 49 EDuc. Rac. 41, 48 (1968).
,1 In Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301 (lst Cir. 1978), the First Circuit
upheld a Board finding that department chairpersons were not supervisors or managerial
employees although they made recommendations concerning the appointment and promotion
of full-time faculty. The court stressed that all faculty employment matters ultimately were
resolved by the trustees at Boston University. Notwithstanding the input of the department
chairpersons in employment status decisions, the court stated that the Board "was entitled
to find that the chairperson's recommendations were not effective" and that they therefore
were not "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 306. In addition, since the
chairpersons' recommendations were made only after consultation with full-time faculty
members, the court stated there was "firm footing" for the Board's ruling that in making the
recommendations the department chairperson "was acting 'in the interest' of the faculty,
not of the employer." Id. at 306. It was also observed that the chairpersons lacked discretion
in formulating department budgets. Id. Similarly in NLRB v. Wentworth Inst., 515 F.2d 550
(lst Cir. 1975), the court upheld faculty unionization at an institution where professors had
input into "the scheduling of exams and classes" but did not have "substantive authority"
to manage the university. Id. at 557.
" See Statement of Government of College and Universities, reprinted in 52 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 375 (1966); Corson, supra note 39, at 106-08, 113-15; Kahn, supra note 2, at 60-72. By
participating in decisions affecting all aspects of the university's instructional program,
AAHE REp., supra note 43, faculty members exert substantial influence even in universities
that are more bureaucratic than Yeshiva. See Corson, supra note 39, at 97-117; Kahn, supra
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While the Second Circuit expressly limited its holding in
Yeshiva to the facts in that case, it is clear that the decision will
have widespread impact on faculty attempts to unionize." The
court's apparent unwillingness to modify the concepts of
"supervisor" and "manager" to account for the unique aspects of
labor-management relations in academic institutions suggests that
it will be reluctant in future cases to extend the Act's protection to
faculty members at other institutions. Considering the likely effect
of the Yeshiva decision, it is hoped that the Board will act promptly
note 2, at 68-73; Tice, supra note 39, at 131-32; Wollett, supra note 42, at 432. Although the
extent of faculty influence varies from university to university, see Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker
& Riley, Diversity in Higher Education: Professional Autonomy, in GOVERNING ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATIONS 42 (G. Riley & J. Baldridge eds. 1977); Corson, supra note 39, at 113-15;
CARNEGIE COMMISSION REPORT 5, 13 (1973), it is apparent that the nature of their work requires
university professors to serve a dual role as part manager and part professional employee.
Baldridge & Kemerer, Images of Governance: Collective Bargaining Versus Traditional
Models, in GOVERNING ACADEMIC ORGANIZATIONS 252, 267 (G. Riley & J. Baldridge eds. 1977);
see Hybrid, supra note 45, at 768; AAHE REP., supra note 43, at 21.
That university faculty members in the public sector are permitted to unionize in some
states lends support to the argument that policymaking authority is an incident of employ-
ment and should not preclude collective bargaining by professors. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
3501-3509 (Deering 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153a-g (West 1977 & Supp. 1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.76 (West Supp.
1979); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1978-1979); see New York
v. Federation of Teachers Local 1733, 2 P.E.R.B. 3492 (1969); Board of Higher Educ. v.
United Fed. of College Teachers, 2 P.E.R.B. 3467 (1969); In re Board of Higher Educ., 2
P.E.R.B. 3257 (1969). Significantly, only those employees who formulate or negotiate collec-
tive bargaining agreements are prevented from unionizing. E.g., Metropolitan Suburban Bus
Auth. v. Public Emp. Rel. Bd., 48 App. Div. 2d 206, 211, 368 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70-71 (3d Dep't
1975); see Town of Huntington v. Civil Serv. Emp. Assoc., 10 P.E.R.B. 4072 (1977). It has
been suggested that uniform rules should govern the unionization of professional educators
in both the public and private sectors. See Jascourt, Reasons Why Faculty Members Accept
or Reject Union in Higher Education: An Overview, 7 J. OF L. & EDUC. 51 (1978); Note,
Collective Bargaining by University and College Faculty Under the NLRA, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
71, 92-96 (1975). See also Howlett, Perspectives In Public Sector Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 23, 34-36 (T. Tice ed. 1972).
11 Since the Board first asserted jurisdiction over employees in universities, there has
been a dramatic increase in unionization efforts. Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d
301, 304 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978); Hagengruber, supra note 31, at 53 n.1; Jascourt, supra note 47,
at 51. As of 1977, faculties in over 400 public and private university campuses had selected
unions to serve as their exclusive bargaining representatives. GOVERNING ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATIONS XV (G. Riley & J. Baldridge eds. 1977). This growth in unionization was
stimulated by a deteriorating labor market for full-time faculty, increased governmental
involvement in regulating and directing education, reduced public confidence in professional
educators, diminished financial resources to compensate faculty and develop innovative pro-
gramming and the perceived gains obtained by nonacademic personnel who had joined un-
ions. See, e.g., McHugh, supra note 43, at 44-45; Sumberg, Should Faculty Organize?, in
FACULTY POWER: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 117 (T. Tice ed. 1972); Marmion, supra
note 45, at 41. One commentator has suggested that union activities at many universities may
have to be reanalyzed in light of Yeshiva. Kohn, Managerial Role Found at Private Universi-
ties, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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to establish a set of rules to clarify the bargaining rights of univer-
sity professors at private nonprofit educational institutions.
Barbara M. Kessler
